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THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF EVIL
Bruce Russell

In this paper I consider several versions of the argument from evil against the existence of
a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and wholly good and raise some objections to them.
Then I offer my own version of the argument from evil that says that if God exists, nothing
happens that he should have prevented from happening and that he should have prevented
the brutal rape and murder of a certain little girl if he exists. Since it was not prevented,
God does not exist. My conclusion rests on the claim that no outweighing good was served
by allowing that murder, or any other instance of comparable evil, to occur. I take up the
objection that my argument moves illicitly from apparently pointless suffering to the claim
that there is reason to believe that there is pointless suffering. I offer an example to show
that the existence of apparently pointless suffering counts to some extent against the existence of God and to show that no basic belief that God exists that rests on certain sorts of
grounds can remain justified in the face of apparently pointless suffering.

I. The Problem of Evil

The best known argument against the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful,
wholly good God is to be found in the problem of evil. It is a problem both for philosophers and ordinary people who must be puzzled as to how God could permit
evils which people, had they the power, would be morally required to prevent.
A very simple argument from the existence of evil to the non-existence of God
goes as follows:
1.
2.
3.

If God exists, there would be no evil in the world.

But there is evil in the world.
Therefore, God does not exist.

(I) is false if there are some goods which could not exist without correlative
evils and the world is better with those goods and those evils than without either.
God does not act wrongly, nor is he less than omnipotent, if he does not prevent or
eliminate some evil, which necessarily accompanies some good, where that good
makes the world better than it otherwise would have been.
There do seem to be some kinds of virtue that require the existence of evil. How
could there be compassion, sympathy and the cheerful or courageous bearing of
suffering without suffering, heroism and courage without danger, tolerance without irritation, forgiveness without hurt, self-sacrifice without loss and the overcoming of temptation without temptation?!
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There is some question as to whether all of these virtues need be accompanied
by the corresponding evils and whether the putative evils are really intrinsically
bad. For instance, couldn't there be compassion and sympathy with what only
seemed to be suffering, even if that would require a great deal of deception?2
And are danger and temptation intrinsically bad or only contingently connected
to what is (e.g., fear and the formation of bad intentions)? Further, even if some
of the virtues are necessarily connected to things which are intrinsically bad
(e.g., forgiveness to hurt and self-sacrifice to loss), it is not obvious that the
world is better with the relevant virtue and the corresponding evil than with
neither. But rather than addressing these questions, I am simply going to assume
that there are some goods that are necessarily connected with things that are
intrinsically bad and that the world is a better place with the necessary evils and
the corresponding goods than without either. This will lead me to consider a
second version of the argument from evil, and a defense, which, if successful,
can also be used against the version of the argument I have been considering.
The second version of the argument from evil goes as follows:
4. If God exists, then no unnecessary evil exists.
5.
Some unnecessary evil exists.
6. . Therefore, God does not exist.
In this version of the argument the second, rather than the first, premise seems
most vulnerable to criticism. How do we know, or why are we justified in
believing, that all the evil in the world is not needed for some greater good?
Rather than addressing that question, though, I am going to criticize (4) since I
think it is possible to do that without the kind of lengthy discussion that would
be needed to assess (5).
People who have offered what has been called "the free will defense" have
argued that unnecessary evils can exist in the best of all possible worlds God
could create. They argue that the kind of free will that is of value is incompatible
with determinism, so God could not have determined people to freely choose
what is right and good. God could have created a world with this incompatibilist
sort of free will and the possibility of evil or a world without either. Since the
incompatibilist sort of free will is of greater value than any compatibilist sort,
the first kind of world would be better and God would therefore create it. But
in that world it is possible for someone to exercise his free will for evil ends.
If someone does, then some unnecessary evil will result since that person could
have freely chosen to do what was right. God is not less than wholly good, and
not less than supreme, if evil exists as the result of the free activity of free agents
in the best of all possible worlds he could create, even if such a world is not
the best of all possible worlds, period. Hence it is possible for both God and
unnecessary evil to exist. So (4) is false.
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Now one might criticize this argument against (4) on the grounds that a kind
of freedom which is compatible with determinism is at least as valuable as the
kind that has a central role in the free will defense. If that were true, then a
wholly good God would create free agents and deternline them to do what is
morally best because such a world would be better than one in which people
had some incompatibilist sort of freedom but which, because of that, also contained the possibility of unnecessary evil. That would be true even if that latter
world were better than a world without any sort of freedom and also without
even the possibility of unnecessary evil.
But rather than get into a long discussion about the nature and value of free
will, I am going to consider a third version of the argument from evil that I
believe side-steps those difficult issues. The argument goes as follows:
7.

If God exists, then nothing happens which he should have prevented
from happening.
8. If something happens that any human moral agent should have
prevented if he knew about it and could have prevented it without
serious risk to himself or others, then something happens which
God should have prevented from happening.
9.
Something has happened that any human moral agent should have
prevented if he knew about it and could have prevented it without
serious risk to himself or others.
10. Therefore, God does not exist.
The example I have in mind that supports (9) involves a little girl in Flint,
Michigan who was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on
New Year's Day of 1986. The girl's mother was living with her boyfriend,
another man who was unemployed, her two children, and her 9-month old infant
fathered by the boyfriend. On New Year's Eve all three adults were drinking at
a bar near the woman's home. The boyfriend had been taking drugs and drinking
heavily. He was asked to leave the bar at 8:00 p.m. After several reappearances
he finally stayed away for good at about 9:30 p.m. The woman and the
unemployed man remained at the bar until 2:00 a.m. at which time the woman
went home and the man to a party at a neighbor'S home. Perhaps out of jealousy,
the boyfriend attacked the woman when she walked into the house. Her brother
was there and broke up the fight by hitting the boyfriend who was passed out
and slumped over a table when the brother left. Later the boyfriend attacked the
woman again, and this time she knocked him unconscious. After checking the
children, she went to bed. Later the woman's 5-year old girl went downstairs
to go to the bathroom. The unemployed man returned from the party at 3:45
a.m. and found the 5-year old dead. She had been raped, severely beaten over
most of her body and strangled to death by the boyfriend. 3
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Any human moral agent should have prevented what happened to that child
if that person knew about what was going on and could have prevented it from
happening without serious risk to himself or others. Hence (9) is true since an
act of the sort described in (9) has occurred.
(7) is true because a wholly good God does no wrong and so, if he exists,
nothing happens which He should have prevented from happening.
The critic of this argument must attack (8). Something like (8) has been
criticized on two grounds. First, it has been argued that it may be wrong of one
person, but not wrong of someone else, to permit a person to be treated in a
certain way, because the former, but not the latter, stands in a special relationship
to the person in question. For instance, it might be that only one of the people
is a parent of the person in question. So God may stand in a special relationship
to his creatures so that it was not wrong of him to let the little girl in Flint be
brutally murdered even though it would have been wrong of any human moral
agent to allow the murder if that agent could easily have prevented it. 4
While it is possible that God's special relationship to his creatures makes it
morally permissible for him, but not for any of us, to allow the brutal murder
of a 5-year old girl, it is not plausible to think it does. It has been said that
God's relationship to his creatures is like that of a parent to his child. But surely
that special relationship would not justify God in permitting the brutal murder
of the 5-year old since it would not have been permissible of the mother of the
child in Flint to have failed to prevent the killing of her child (even by another
of her children) because she was its parent. If anything, the special relationship
of parent to child would make the duty to prevent the child's brutal murder even
more stringent, rather than removing the obligation altogether.
Another criticism of (8) relies on the fact that differences in knowledge can
determine differences in obligations. 5 I might be obligated to shove a child to
the ground if I see someone ready to pull the trigger on a gun pointed at the
child, while someone who knew that it was only a toy gun being used by a
father in a game of "cops and robbers" with his child would not be so obligated.
Or a member of some tribe in his ignorance might be obligated to prevent a
physician from cutting open a fellow tribesman (say, to remove his appendix)
while others who knew better would not. If (as surely must be granted) God's
knowledge surpasses the knowledge of any human being, then God may not be
obligated to do what humans in their ignorance are obligated to do. So (8) is false.
However, I believe there is an argument that can still be constructed that is
based on the example of the little girl in Flint that offers strong grounds for
thinking a Supreme Being does not exist. It is:
11. If there was no outweighing good that morally justified letting the
little girl in Flint be brutally murdered, then God should have
prevented that murder from happening.
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12. There was no outweighing good that morally justified letting the
little girl in Flint be brutally murdered.
13. Therefore, God should have prevented that murder from happening.
14. If God exists, then nothing happens which he should have prevented
from happening.
15. Therefore, God does not exist.
Note first that this argument is not: necessarily, if God exists, then the brutal
murder of the little girl in Flint does not occur. Any argument which contains
that premise or one of the following form:
necessarily, if God exists, then evil state of affairs (action or event) X
does not exist
is open to the objection that it is possible for God and the relevant evil state of
affairs (action or event) to exist. Plantinga's Free Will Defense is of that nature.
He shows first that the existence of God is compatible with some other state of
affairs and second that if God and that state of affairs exist, then the relevant
evil must exist. From these two claims it follows, by a theorem of modal logic,
that it is possible that God and the relevant evil exist. 6 But defenses are irrelevant
to the argument I have given since the only premises that purport to be necessary
truths are (11) and (14) and they cannot be shown to be false by showing how
it is possible for God and some evil state of affairs (action or event) to exist.
Now the only premise that seems open to question is (12). There seem to be
plenty of outweighing goods that could justify letting the little girl in Flint suffer.
Perhaps if that suffering were prevented, even more suffering would occur somewhere else in the universe (among the angels, say) or perhaps the little girl will
be better off in the end (say, because she will go to heaven and be with God)
because of her suffering.
But showing that it is possible that there are outweighing goods served by the
suffering is not enough to show (12) is false. If it is reasonable to reject (12) it
is because it is reasonable to believe that there are such goods that morally
justify letting the little girl in Flint be brutally murdered.
According to Plantinga, defenses against the argument from evil only try to
show how the existence of God is compatible with the existence of certain
instances, types or amounts of evil in the world while theodicies "try to answer
in some detail the question 'what is the source of the evil we find, and why does
God permit if"7 A theodicy is needed to explain what outweighing goods morally
justified letting the little girl be brutally murdered. But recent theodicies seem
unable to answer the question, "Why did God permit the suffering of the little
girl in Flint?"
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Richard Swinburne and John Hick have offered theodicies that one might at
first think promise to answer that question. Swinburne thinks it is a good thing
that there are beings who through their free choices can make a difference in
the world, who can affect their own destiny and that of others and the world.
Hence God had reason to create beings with freedom of choice and the power
to make a difference in themselves and the world through their choices. 8 Of
course God could have created beings with more limited freedom or power, in
particular without the ability to harm others. But Swinburne argues that it is a
good thing for people to have deep responsibility for others and they could not
have it if they were not able to both benefit and harm other people. 9 He also
argues that if it is a good thing for agents to have a choice, it is a good thing
for them to have a significant choice, a choice between important goods and
evils. 10 Presumably choice would be less significant if we could choose not to
help others but not choose to harm them. So in the end Swinburne would justify
suffering like that experienced by the little girl in Flint on the grounds that the
freedom of choice and action which the boyfriend had were so valuable that they
should not be limited even to prevent the evil which resulted from their exercise.
There are many similarities between Swinburne's theodicy and that of John
Hick. (Hick himself sees Swinburne's theodicy as being of the same Irenaean
type as his.") According to Hick the possibility of moral evil is necessary if
people are to achieve the infinite good of having become morally and spiritually
good persons through the exercise of their own free choices. He thinks that moral
growth would be impossible without the possibility of real (significant) suffering 12 ,
just as Swinburne thinks that deep responsibility for others is possible only if
people can significantly harm others through the exercise of their freedom of
choice and action. The difference between them is that for Hick it is the end
point of having become a morally and spiritually good person that is valuable
and justifies the possibility of significant moral evil '3 while for Swinburne it is
the ability to make a difference in the world itself, regardless of whether it
culminates in moral and spiritual perfection, that is valuable and justifies that
same possibility. For Hick it is having arrived at a certain point after having
taken a particular journey that is of great value while for Swinburne it is the
journey itself.
While I can agree that what Swinburne and Hick see as valuable is valuable,
I cannot agree that it is so valuable that it could justify someone in permitting
suffering like that endured by the little girl in Flint. It is good that a person in
need of a vital organ should receive it but it would be wrong to allow a young
child to die in order to procure the needed organ. It is also good that the boyfriend
or others had the opportunity to develop themselves morally and spiritually, but
it would also be wrong to afford them that opportunity if providing it means that
a little girl will have to suffer terribly.
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In commenting on the moral permissibility of allowing some people to suffer
harm for the benefit of others Swinburne has noted three differences between
human persons and God which he believes accounts for the difference in the
moral status of their acts. First he says that the agent who is going to inflict
suffering or allow it to occur can ask the person who is going to suffer for
permission to allow the suffering, but when God was deciding whether to create
a world and what kind of world to create, there were no persons to consult. 14
But this difference is absent in some cases involving the suffering of little
children since some are so young as to be unable to give permission, and it
would still be wrong of us to let them suffer to benefit someone else. Furthermore,
God in his omniscience will know without consulting them, as even we in our
limited knowledge know, that people will not want to be treated in the way that
the little girl in Flint was treated.
Second, Swinburne argues that God as the author of our being has rights over
us which we do not have over other people, just as parents have rights over their
children that strangers lack. 15 Swinburne would agree that parents do not have
the right to let one of their children brutally murder another child of theirs but
he says, "a God who is, ex hypothesi, so much more the author of our being
than our parents, has so many more rights in this respect. "'6
But it is not obvious that this claim is true. Dr. Frankenstein is more the author
of his monster's being than normal parents are of the being of their children,
but he does not have more rights over it than they have over their children. And
even if God has greater rights over his children than we have over ours, it does
not seem that the rights he has are so great as to make it permissible for him to
benefit one of them at the awful price paid by the little girl in Flint.
The third difference Swinburne brings up is that God knows, while we do
not, how much people suffer and what the effects of their suffering will be. I?
Of course that would not by itself be enough to justify allowing the little girl in
Flint to suffer. Suppose God knew that she would suffer more than we believe
she will. Then he would know something about her suffering we didn't. But
surely that difference in knowledge would not justify him, but not us, in permitting
the suffering.
Swinburne must mean that God knows, for instance, that the little girl will
suffer less than we think. But the question is whether we have reason to believe
that God knows this. If we have reason to believe it, then, since knowledge
implies the truth of what is known, we will also have reason to believe the girl
suffers less than we had thought. But then if God knows the little girl will suffer
a certain amount and we have reason to believe he knows that, and so have
reason to believe she will suffer that amount, how can the difference between
God's knowledge and our reasonable belief make it permissible for God, but
impermissible for us, to let her suffer?
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The third difference Swinburne notes is unable to account for a moral difference
between God's allowing certain suffering and our allowing it. If Swinburne
means that any difference in God's knowledge about the relevant suffering can
account for the moral difference, then he is mistaken. If instead he means that
God knows the relevant suffering is less severe than we think, then that claim
is either unfounded or. if we are justified in believing it, we are also justified
in believing that the suffering is less severe than we had thought. In either case
the relevant moral difference will remain unexplained.
It seems impermissible to let someone suffer as much as the little girl in Flint
did in order to provide someone else with opportunities that will benefit him.
But someone might object that if God should have intervened to prevent the
murder of the little girl in Flint, then he should intervene in all similar cases.
Why should God intervene to prevent this little girl's rape and murder and not
intervene to prevent all similar rapes and murders? And if he should prevent
such serious physical harms, shouldn't he also prevent equally serious psychological harms? But if he did all that, freedom and the opportunity to overcome the
temptation to do evil acts would be destroyed since no one would be able to do
very bad acts. So it really is a choice between a world with significant freedom
and the possibility of evil and one without any significant freedom, with at most
the possibility of doing only slightly bad thingsY Since on the whole a world
with significant freedom and the possibility of evil is better than one without
any significant freedom, God did nothing wrong in creating our world.
Even if our world is better than a world without significant freedom, I do not
believe those are the only two alternatives. That is because it does not folJow
that God should intervene to prevent all very bad things from happening if he
should intervene to prevent some. Perhaps if God intervenes more than m out
of n times a threshold will be passed and very bad consequences will result.
Perhaps people will stop striving to improve their characters if they know that
their evil intentions will not cause anyone harm and, further, they wiII know
that if God intervenes more than m out of n times. So God will intervene in
some cases like that involving the little girl in Flint but not in all.
The trouble with this reply is that it leaves it open that God has intervened
the optimum number of times. Why are we justified in believing that things
would not be a lot worse if he intervened one more time? Why are we justified
in believing that we are not right below the threshold and one more intervention
will put us over the top?
The proper response is that we are justified in believing these things on the
basis of what we know about human psychology. No one would give up striving
to perfect himself just because someone like the little girl in Flint was saved.
People are not encouraged to make themselves better because they have observed
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what seems to be a case of gratuitous suffering, nor discouraged from perfecting
themselves if some such suffering is prevented.
So far I have been considering whether allowing the brutal murder of the little
girl in Flint could be morally justified because certain goods (viz., freedom and
certain opportunities) could not have been realized if it had been prevented. But
what about the little girl herself? Someone might argue that the little girl's
suffering and death were needed to benefit her on the grounds, say, that she
could only establish the best sort of relationship to God through her suffering.
Sometimes it is necessary to subject a child to a painful operation against her
will in order to provide the most benefit for her all told. Similarly, it may be
necessary to subject a little girl to a certain amount of suffering to enable her
to obtain the benefit of a particular kind of God-relationship. 19
But even if some suffering may be necessary for the fullest and best sort of
relationship with God, it seems contrary to reason to believe that the suffering
that the little girl in Flint experienced is needed to establish such a relationship.
If suffering is needed, wouldn't it have been better to let the girl suffer as the
result of the mistakes she would have made through the exercise of her own free
will? Our experience suggests that when suffering helps establish a better relationship between child and parent it is through suffering of that sort, or at least not
through brutal suffering which the child did not bring on herself, which the
parents easily could have prevented, and where the child believes they could.
We must grant that there may be some reason we don't understand why the
little girl must be allowed to suffer terribly at the hands of her mother's boyfriend
(or someone else) to attain union with God. But what is granted does not imply
that it is reasonable to believe that the good of that union could only be purchased
at the awful price the little girl had to pay. And it is the latter which must be
established for (12) to be reasonably rejected.
II. Objections and Replies

Someone might object that my argument turns on the assumption that if it is
pennissible for someone to allow some evil to occur, then allowing it to occur
must be needed to realize some outweighing good. But this claim is false for
three reasons.
First, it can be pennissible to allow an evil to occur where allowing it is
needed to fulfill a duty or to satisfy some other deontological requirement. I
accept this anti-teleological objection and simply ask the reader to construe
"outweighing good" broadly enough to include deontological considerations. It
should also be construed broadly enough to include preventing an even worse
evil from occurring.
Second, it can be permissible to allow an evil to occur even though it is not
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needed to realize some outweighing good. It is permissible for me to let Jones
drown, and to save five other drowning people just like Jones instead, even
though allowing him to die is not needed to realize the good of saving five people
since letting Smith drown and pulling Jones aboard would have achieved the
same result. I also accept this objection and reply that my argument should be
construed as claiming that neither allowing the brutal rape and murder of the
little girl in Flint, nor anyone other instance of a comparable evil, was needed
to realize some outweighing good. So God should have prevented the evil in
Flint, or at least one other evil relevantly like it.
Third, it might be objected that if allowing X to occur is needed to realize
some outweighing good, then X is also needed for some outweighing good.
Hence I have to hold that if it is permissible for someone to allow some evil to
occur, then that evil must be needed to realize some outweighing good. But this
claim is false because, as I admit, it might be permissible for God to allow some
evil acts to occur, for otherwise there could not be significant freedom, yet those
acts are not needed for there to be significant freedom. In the relevant cases,
people could have freely done what is right and good and significant freedom
still would have existed.
I reject this objection because I reject the assumption which links what I do
say to the unacceptable conclusion which it founds. That assumption is: if allowing
X to occur is needed to realize some outweighing good, then X is also needed
to realize some outweighing good. The example that is used against the unacceptable conclusion can be used against this assumption. Allowing people to perform
certain evil acts is necessary for them to have significant freedom. If God
intervened every time someone tried to do something very bad, then there would
not be significant freedom. But the actual performance of those evil deeds is not
needed for there to be significant freedom, nor, I have argued, for there to be
any other outweighing good. 20
So my argument does tum on the assumption that if it is permissible for
someone to allow some evil to occur, then allowing it, or some comparable evil,
is needed to realize some outweighing good (where "good" is broadly construed).
But I see no reason to reject that assumption.
I have argued that there are no outweighing goods that justified failing to
prevent the brutal rape and murder of the little girl in Flint. My argument has
been that the good of those other than the little girl was not enough to justify
non-intervention and that there is no reason to think that non-intervention was
needed to benefit the little girl or to prevent something even worse from happening
to her. Further, I argued that it was not plausible to think that the only two
alternatives open to God were to create this world, which contains the brutal
murder, or some other world without that or a similar murder, but also without
significant freedom.
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But theists might object that my argument is really one from ignorance and
manifests a high degree of hubris since one is justified in believing that it was
wrong not to intervene only if one knows that no good ends were served by
non-intervention. But, for all we know, there are goods other than the ones I
considered that could only be realized by permitting the brutal murder of the
little girl in Flint and that do morally justify that non-intervention. For all we
know, if God intervened in this case, the world would be much worse on the
whole than if he did not. The objector might contend that I have argued from
the fact that there is apparently pointless evil in the world to the conclusion that
there is, or there is adequate reason to believe there is, pointless suffering in the
world.
A first response to this objection might be that there is nothing wrong in
arguing from the apparent pointlessness of non-intervention to its wrongness.
Suppose someone had been there when the boyfriend began to mistreat the little
girl. Suppose this person knew he could easily have stopped the boyfriend at
that point but did not, and knew also that if he failed to intervene the little girl
would be brutally murdered. Now if after careful consideration we could not see
how that non-intervention was needed to produce some good or prevent some
even worse evil, then we would be completely justified in believing that the
person did something wrong in failing to intervene. Anybody who claimed that
such a belief would not be justified because, for all we knew, there were ends
we had not thought of that could only be realized by non-intervention would be
unwarranted in making that claim on those grounds.
Now the theist might agree with my claim that we would be completely
justified in believing the person who failed to intervene in the circumstances I
described did wrong but deny the analogy applies when it is a question of God's
failing to intervene. First, the theist might argue that we are justified in believing
the person did something wrong in failing to intervene because we are justified
in believing that he, like us, had no reason to believe that his non-intervention
was needed to realize some good end or to prevent some worse evil. His act
would be permissible only if he had such reason. Since we have adequate reason
to believe he did not, we have adequate reason to believe he did something
wrong. But in the case of God we are not justified in believing that he, like us,
had no reason to believe that his non-intervention was needed to realize some
good end or to prevent some worse evil. If God exists we cannot presume that
if we cannot see a point to the suffering, then neither can he. 21 That is because
God, unlike another human being, is so much superior to us in knowledge and
goodness.
Besides undercutting the analogy I have constructed, the theist might argue
further that, in the kind of case in question, one is not entitled to the claim that
it appears that there is pointless suffering, at least if that claim implies that there
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is prima facie reason to believe that there is pointless suffering. Stephen Wykstra
has argued along these lines. 22 The principle Wykstra relies on is called CORNEA
(the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access) by him and goes as follows:
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim "It
appears that p" only if it is reasonable to believe that, given her cognitive
faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s
would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her.23
Substituting relevant statements in CORNEA we get:
(16) On the basis of there being no outweighing good within our ken
served by the relevant suffering, we are entitled to claim "It appears
that the suffering is pointless" only if it is reasonable to believe that,
given our cognitive faculties and the use we have made of them, if the
suffering were not pointless, some outweighing good would likely be
discernible by us.
Let S be the statement that, given our cognitive faculties and the use we have
made of them, if the suffering were not pointless (that is, if it had a point), some
outweighing good (which gives it its point) would likely be discernible by us.
The theist must argue that it is not reasonable to believe S in order to conclude
that we are not entitled to claim that a certain suffering appears to be pointless.
The theist's argument risks being invalid or begging the question if she argues
that it is not reasonable to believe that if God exists, then S, on the grounds,
say, that we have reason to believe that if God exists, then, if the suffering had
a point, it is unlikely that an outweighing good (which gives it its point) would
be discernible by us. 24 The claim "it is not reasonable to believe that if God
exists, then S" does not itself entail that it is not reasonable to believe S. While
one could argue from the claim that if God exists, then, if the suffering had a
point, it is unlikely that an outweighing good would be discernible by us and
the claim that God exists to the conclusion that it is not reasonable to believe
S, that argument threatens to beg the question in favor of God's existence. So
the theist must argue that whether or not God exists, it is not reasonable to
believe S.
In any case the argument from CORNEA and the claim that it is not reasonable
to believe S to the conclusion that we are not entitled to claim that a certain
suffering appears to be pointless will fail because CORNEA is false. Suppose
on the basis of perceiving myself sitting in a chair in my study (where neither
the chair nor the study are in a vat!) I claim that it appears that I am not a brain
in a vat. Against CORNEA, I am entitled to "It appears that I am not a brain
in a vat" on the basis of perceiving myself sitting in a chair even if it is not
reasonable to believe that, given my cognitive faculties and the use I have made
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of them, if I were a brain in a vat, my perceptions of myself sitting in the chair
would likely be different in some discernible way.
The reason I would be justified in believing that I am not a brain in a vat in
the circumstances I imagined is that I would have violated no epistemic duties
in forming the relevant belief, and there need be no defect in my noetic structure
in virtue of my holding that belief in the way I do, since, by hypothesis, there
is nothing I could do to discover I am a brain in a vat if I were. Of course from
that it does not follow that I know I am not a brain in a vat if I am not. A person
looking at a bam will not know it is a barn if, say, 99 out of 100 buildings that
look just like it are merely bam facades, even if he has violated no epistemic
duties and there are no defects in his noetic structure, in forming the belief that
the building before him is a bam. He would not know that it is because it would
only be by accident that what he believed was true. And the same might be said
about the belief that I am not a brain in a vat. But surely there is a normative
sense of justification, that even together with true belief does not imply knowledge, and in that sense at least I would be justified in believing I am not a brain
in a vat on the basis of perceiving myself sitting in a chair.
Now the theist might try to revise CORNEA in order to reach the conclusion
that the atheist has no reason to believe that there is pointless suffering on the
grounds that some suffering appears to be pointless. Consider the following
principle:
(17) If (a) it appears to X that A is not-B, (b) X has reason to believe
that if S were P, A would appear to be not-B even if it were B and (c)
X has reason to believe that S is P, then X has no reason to believe
that A is not-B on the basis of A's appearing to be not-B.
I think (17) is true and can be used to account for our judgment in an example
involving a person with a bad cold trying to determine by smelling whether some
milk is sour. In that example it appears from its odor that the milk is not sour.
But since the person has reason to believe that if he had a cold the milk would
not appear to be sour even if it were, and has reason to believe he has a cold,
he has no reason to believe that the milk is not sour on the basis of its appearing
not to be sour to him.
If the theist uses (17) to argue that a person, X, has no reason to believe that
certain instances of suffering are pointless on the basis of their appearing not to
have a point, then he must assert something like:
(18) X has reason to believe that if God exists, then all the suffering
which appears not to have a point would appear that way even if it had
a point
and (19) X has reason to believe God exists.
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(18) seems false. It is hard to believe that if God exists all the suffering that
appears not to have a point would appear that way even if it had a point. Why
would a wholly good God leave us so totally in the dark? No good parent would
both fail to intervene and leave his/her puzzled offspring so completely in the
dark as to his/her motives. For instance, a good mother would either stop her
employee from calling and waking her son in the middle of the night or explain
why she could or should not. Permitting evil to occur that is perceived as pointless
and preventable tends to destroy, rather than foster, loving relationships between
parents and their offspring and, one would think, between God and his creatures.
Even if the theist can establish (18), he must also establish (19) jf he is to
show that no one, not even the atheist, has adequate reason to believe that there
is, on the grounds that there appears to be, pointless suffering. This will require
the theist to offer more than merely a defense against evil, that is, it will require
him to show more than that it is merely possible that all the apparently pointless
evil in the world really has a point.
At this point there seems to be a standoff. The theist has not been able to
show that apparently pointless suffering cannot be used to ground the claim that
there is pointless suffering but the atheist has not been able to show that it can.
But consider the following example the atheist could offer to break the deadlock.
A skilled and beneficent doctor visits the village of a group of Stone Age people
who have never seen a doctor before and know nothing of modem medicine.
The doctor sees a man in great pain whom he diagnoses correctly as suffering
from an appendicitis. The doctor has successfully performed similar operations
in the past under crude conditions and proposes to operate on the fellow with
the appendicitis. That person's father won't let him. No one in the tribe has ever
seen anyone with a gash in the abdomen survive. Though the father admits that
it is possible that the doctor wants to help his son and that cutting his son's
abdomen open with a knife will save him, the father is perfectly rational in
believing that cutting open his son will not save him and so perfectly rational
in believing that the doctor either does not intend to help his son or does not
know what he is doing. He would be less than perfectly rational if he believed
otherwise.
In this example the proposed operation appears pointless to the father since it
does not appear to him to be a way, and so not the only way, of saving his son.
And because the operation appears pointless, the father is justified in believing
that the doctor who proposes to perform the operation suffers from some sort of
defect, either of character or of knowledge.
In a similar way pointless suffering gives everyone reason to believe that a
being who has no defects, who is perfect, does not exist. Of course this reason
could be defeated if the point of all the apparently pointless suffering were made
clear (that is, if a theodicy were provided) or overridden if there were strong
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grounds for believing God exists. That would be analogous to a case involving
the Stone Age people in which the father either comes to understand the point
of the proposed operation or has strong grounds for thinking the doctor is good
and knowledgeable about curing the sick, even if he does not come to understand
how cutting open his son could help him. But apparently pointless suffering does
count against the existence of God and recognition of the possibility that it has
a point is not enough by itself to make belief in God rational, just as for the
father the apparently pointless operation proposed by the doctor counts against
the doctor's being both beneficent and knowledgeable and recognition of the
possibility that it has a point is not enough by itself to make trust in the doctor
rational. More than merely a defense against evil is required for belief in God
to be justified for those who are aware of the problem of evil. 25
Of course the fact that certain evidence counts against a proposition does not
imply that, all things considered, one is not justified in believing that proposition.
In the case of Feike the famous Frisian, the fact that 9 out of 10 Frisians can't
swim counts against the proposition that Feike can swim. But the fact that Feike
is a Frisian lifeguard and 99 out of 100 Frisian lifeguards can swim counts
decisively in favor of the proposition that Feike can swim. Similarly, if one had
good grounds for believing God exists, then the existence of evil need not count
decisively against the existence of God.
The analogy of the doctor and the Stone Age tribesman teaches us that the
existence of evil counts to some extent against the existence of God. The apparent
pointlessness of the doctor's proposed course of action counts against the belief
the tribesman might have that the doctor is beneficent and knowledgeable even
though the tribesman cannot presume that if he can't see a point to the doctor's
proposal, then neither can the doctor, if the doctor is beneficent and knowledgeable. Similarly, the existence of evil counts against belief in God even though
we cannot presume that if we can't see a point to certain instances of suffering
then neither can God if God exists.
Further questions arise as to how much the existence of apparently pointless
suffering counts against the existence of God and as to what sorts of grounds
for the belief that God exists can be overridden by the existence of that sort of
suffering. By modifying the example of the doctor and the tribesman, I believe
it can be shown that the existence of apparently pointless suffering renders any
belief in God that is based on certain observations of nature unjustified.
Alvin Plantinga holds that belief in God can be rational, and can constitute
knowledge, even if it is not based on evidence. According to Plantinga, "a person
has evidence for a proposition p only if she knows or rationally believes another
proposition q which supports p, and furthermore believes p on the basis of q."26
A belief is rational just in case the person who holds it violates no intellectual
obligations and displays no flaws in his noetic structure in virtue of holding the
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belief in the way he does. Following Plantinga, let us call a belief properly basic
if it is not held on the basis of any other beliefs and the person who holds it is
rational in holding it. Let us call a belief properly basic in the full sense if it is
properly basic and the person who holds it knows what he believes if the belief
is true.
Plantinga thinks that certain beliefs that entail God exists can be properly basic
in the full sense in certain conditions and that these conditions constitute grounds,
though not evidence, for those beliefs. In particular, he thinks that if one forms
the belief that this flower was created by God or this vast and intricate universe
was created by God upon contemplating the flower or beholding the starry
heavens or thinking about the vast reaches of the universe, then those belief can
be properly basic in the full sense.27
If so, then it would seem that the tribesman could form beliefs about the
doctor's capacities and character that are properly basic in the full sense. Suppose
the tribesman forms the belief that the doctor is good and knowledgeable about
treating the sick and infirm (that is, that he always knows what he is doing when
treating the sick and infirm) on beholding him helping the sick and injured or
on thinking of the many ways in which the doctor has helped his people. It
seems that that belief could be properly basic in the full sense if the belief that
God created this vast and intricate universe can be.
But whether that belief can be properly basic in the full sense or not, could
it even be rational for the tribesman to hold it given that (i) he knows the doctor
proposes to cure his son by cutting open his abdomen, (ii) he does not know
and is not aware of a single person who knows of anyone who has received a
gash in the abdomen and survived and (iii) he has seen the doctor helping the
sick and injured people in his tribe? It depends in part on whether the tribesman
has knowledge of the doctor's curing the sick or helping the injured in non-standard ways. If the doctor has cured the sick or helped the injured in ways like
those the tribesman has seen, or at least knows, to have worked in the past, then
he has no reason to believe that the non-standard way the doctor proposes to
cure his son will work, and every reason (based on (ii» to believe it won't. Even
if (iii) justifies the tribesman in believing the doctor is good, given only (i)-(iii),
he will be rationally required to believe that what the doctor proposes is not
what is best for his son, and so required to believe that the doctor does not
always know what he is doing when it comes to curing the sick.
It might seem that the tribesman's belief that what the doctor proposes is in
the best interest of his son is justified in the light of his other knowledge only
if he is justified in believing that the doctor has cured the sick or helped the
injured in non-standard ways. By analogy one might conclude that a person's
belief that a wholly good, all-knowing, all-powerful being exists is justified in
the light of that person's knowledge of apparently pointless suffering only if she
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is now justified in believing that some suffering that appeared pointless to her
in the past has a certain point in God's plan.
But there must be something wrong with that analogy. Consider Cleanthes'
example of a voice in the clouds from Part III of Hume's Dialogues. Suppose
someone heard an articulate voice in the clouds which was much louder and
more melodious than any which humans could produce artificially, that this voice
was heard round the world speaking to each nation in its own language and
dialect, and that it delivered a message worthy of a benevolent being superior
to mankind. That person's belief in God could be justified even if in no case
had she come to see the point of what had appeared to her to be pointless suffering.
The problem with the analogy is that even the tribesman could be justified in
believing that what the doctor proposes is in the best interests of his son without
being justified in believing that the doctor cured the sick or helped the injured
in non-standard ways. Knowledge of the reliable testimony of others about the
doctor's character and capacities could be enough to justify trust in the doctor
despite the apparent pointlessness of his proposal.
In the case of the doctor all that can be said is that if the tribesman has no
grounds for thinking that the doctor is good and knowledgeable independent of
his beholding the doctor helping the sick or injured in the normal ways, then,
in the light of the apparent pointlessness of the doctor's proposal, it is not rational
for the tribesman to believe that what the doctor proposes is in the best interest
of his son. Similarly, in the case of belief in God, all that can be said is that if
the believer has no grounds for thinking God exists independent of his contemplating a flower or beholding the starry heavens or thinking about the vast
reaches of the universe, then, in the light of the apparent pointlessness of much
suffering, it is not rational to believe that God exists.
My point is not that no basic belief can remain justified in the face of counter
evidence, and not even that no basic belief that God exists can (e.g., recall the
basic belief in God formed on hearing the voice in the clouds). My argument
from analogy is only meant to show that some basic beliefs in God's existence
cannot remain justified in the face of apparently pointless suffering.
The gap between our knowledge and that of God, if God exists, will be much
wider than the gap between the father's knowledge and that of the doctor. But
that difference does not matter to the question of what it is reasonable for us to
believe about the existence of God or for the father to believe about the doctor.
Given the father's limited knowledge and experience, it would be contrary to
reason for him to trust in the doctor, even if as a matter of fact the doctor is
knowledgeable and beneficent. Lacking an adequate theodicy and given our
limited knowledge and experience, barring strong grounds for believing that God
exists, it is contrary to reason for us to believe in God, even if as a matter of
fact he exists.
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If parents really wanted to make their children feel that they were on their
own, they might arrange things so that reason required their children to believe
that they were dead, even if they were not. lO
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